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The aim of this paper is to shed light on the role of legislators and lawyers in establishing 
accounting  regulations  concerning  corporate  groups  in  France  during  the  1930s  and  the 
Occupation (1940 – 1944). A review of bills proposing accounting regulation shows that no 
significant  progress  was  to  be  achieved.  Furthermore,  while  some  lawyers  called  for  a 
comprehensive regulation of corporate groups, no such progress was made during the inter-
war period. Ultimately it's the Vichy government which introduced the first regulations on 
accounting  subsidiaries  in  the  French  Plan  Comptable  and  limited  the  reciprocal 
shareholdings in the Act of March 4, 1943. 
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The  development  of  corporate  groups  during  the  inter-war  period  represents  one  of  the 
greatest structural shifts in French capitalism (Caron, 1995). Several works on the history of 
companies and on accounting have shown the impact of the subsidiarisation phenomenon. 
These  include  Alais,  Froges  &  Camargue  (Bensadon,  2007),  Compagnie  Générale 
d’Electricité  (Bouvier,  2005),  L’Energie  industrielle  (Vuillermot,  2001)  and  Schneider 
(d’Angio, 2000). With this development of shareholdings came a need for some companies to 
have a better understanding of the financial situation of the corporate group as a whole. This 
was the case for Alais, Froges & Camargue, who from the end of the 1920s onwards began 
producing financial statements in which some of the key concepts of today's group accounting 
can be found, like the scope of consolidation, the cancelling out of intercompany transactions 
and the minority interest not accruing to the parent company (Bensadon, 2008). 
However, the development of corporate groups was not the only characteristic feature of the 
inter-war  years.  This  period  was  also  marked  by  successive  politico-financial  scandals 
involving organisations such as 'Aéropostale' (1928), 'La Gazette du Franc' (1930), 'La banque 
Oustric' (1931). The mechanisms which these scandals involved have already been brought to 
light (Thiveaud, 1998). The almost total lack of accounting regulations and the relationships 
between parent companies and subsidiaries played a significant role in the development of 
unscrupulous business practices. While standard accounting practices were established  for 
insurance  and  reinsurance  firms  at  the  end  of  the  1930s,  no  regulation  for  industrial  or 
commercial companies was implemented before the First World War (Lemarchand, 1995).  
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the role of legislators in establishing mechanisms to 
regulate  accounting  and  the  relationships  between  parent  companies  and  subsidiaries  in 
France in the 1930s and during the Occupation. Did legislators try to regulate these new 
corporate  groups  composed  of  a  parent  company  and  subsidiaries?  Did  they  seek  to 
implement accounting regulations with a view to cleaning up business practices? Was the old 
French law on companies from 1867 reworked in order to take into account this new type of 
structure? 
To try to answer these questions, two sources of information have been analysed: the first 
source comprises draft bills submitted by French deputies (Fleury-Ravarin (1921), Chastanet 
(1926) and Auriol (1929)) and the second comprises Law PhD theses researched in French 
universities from the 1930s up to the end of World War II. Priority was given to the latter 
printed source as these pieces of university research not only deal with the legal issues of the 
time, but also outline solutions which it would have been desirable to implement. The theses 
constitute rich material for understanding the legal and management practices of the day.  
Following an inventory of the CUJAS law and economic sciences library, three Law PhD 
theses were identified in which issues concerning the regulation of subsidiaries are discussed. 
These are: Gégout, (1929), Sainton, (1938) and Baratte, (1943). Three other theses were also 
identified which deal specifically with the regulation of balance sheets and which develop, in 
particular, ideas on the financial information to be produced by companies at the head of 
corporate groups. These are the works of Spire, (1931), Percerou, (1932) and Rosset, (1933).  
Reviewing the draft bills demonstrates that legislators did not provide a framework for the 
development of subsidiaries during the 1930s. Even though left-wing deputies denounced the 
abuse  generated  by  the  multiplication  of  subsidiaries  and  highlighted  the  need  for  the 
regulation of balance sheets in an economic context rife with financial scandals, no regulation 
of  subsidiaries  and  balance  sheets  was  established,  except  however,  for  insurance  and 
reinsurance  companies  (I).  While  subsidiaries  were  already  regulated  in  the  UK  and  in 








































1  3 
1930s. (II). No progress was made on the regulation of accounting practices and subsidiaries 
until the French 3rd Republic ended and the Vichy government established plans for the Plan 
comptable  (French  standard  accounting  practices)  (1942)  in  which  the  concepts  of 
subsidiaries and shareholdings were outlined and in which, under a law on companies, the 
first regulation of subsidiaries was introduced via Article 8 of the Law of March 4
th, 1943, 
aimed at limiting reciprocal shareholdings (III). 
1. Unsuccessful attempts at regulating accounting practices  
Several  deputies  from  radical  parties  and  the  parliament’s  left  wing  submitted  draft  bills 
(Fleury-Ravarin, 1921; Chastanet, 1926 and Auriol, 1929) aimed at regulating accounting. 
With  the  exception  of  the  regulation  of  balance  sheets  for  insurance  and  reinsurance 
companies and two decree laws on auditing practices, no comprehensive regulation had been 
established in France.  
A) Henry Fleury-Ravarin, 1921 
At the end of the 19
th Century, France was one of the most liberal countries in Europe in 
terms of accounting (Lemarchand, 1998, p. 30). Apart from two decree laws passed in the 
August and September of 1935, the situation hardly evolved at all during the 1930s. Several 
attempts, beginning in the 1880s, were made to standardise practices, but all were to fail due 
to the absence of a genuine will among the business world for such practices to see the light 
of day. The only standards that were actually implemented concerned insurance companies 
and cooperative banks.  
However, several sets of plans for standardisation were submitted during the 1930s. In order 
to  provide  a  legislative  solution  to  the  financial  scandals  of  the  1920s,  radical  deputies 
regularly  proposed  draft  bills  aimed  at  protecting  savings.  On  each  occasion,  accounting 
regulation was presented as one of the effective ways of preventing undesirable financial 
reporting  practices  in  companies.  In  1921,  Henry  Fleury-Ravarin,  in  response  to  the 
government's lack of action on accounting standardisation despite the successive financial 
scandals,  submitted  a  draft  bill  to  regulate  balance  sheets  in  joint  stock  companies.
1  He 
reminded deputies that the issue had already been raised in 1912, by the commission in charge 
of  investigating  the  Rochette  affair
2  and  that  Jean  Jaurès  had  referred  the  matter  to  the 
Chamber of deputies with the following statement: "The chamber invites the government to 
investigate  and  propose  protective  measures  against  public  savings  fraud:  demanding  in 
                                                 
1  Henry Fleury-Ravarin (1861-1924): Deputy for the Rhone region from 1893 to 1906, then from 1910 to 1914 
and from 1919 to 1924. As a member of the Republican Union group, his legislative activity mainly concerned 
issues linked to fiscal policy, national defence and public health. Upon regaining his seat as deputy in 1919, he 
joined the Républicains de gauche (Left-wing Republicans) and in 1921 became a member of the Democratic 
and Social Republican Party.   
 
2 In 1902 Rochette founded the Crédit Minier, whose aim was to promote the idea of investing in foreign mining 
and industrial companies to small savers. The initiative's success led him to set up the Union Franco-Belge, 
Société des Mines de la Nerva and the Banque Franco-Espagnole among numerous various other financial and 
industrial companies. The multiplication of subsidiaries and setting up of a pyramid scheme of companies 
enabled Rochette to pay out dividends using funds invested in other companies (Lemarchand, 1995, p. 15). 
Rochette was arrested on bankruptcy charges on March 23
rd, 1908. His arrest led to the collapse of the banking 
structure. A parliamentary inquiry was launched to investigate the circumstances of Rochette's arrest. The 
commission in charge of the inquiry and headed by Jean Jaurès denounced the appropriation of public savings by 









































1  4 
particular, if it is not possible to make it a requirement that every company state the terms 
under  which  balance  sheets  are  produced  in  its  articles  of  association"  (Fleury-Ravarin, 
1921, p. 1926). Almost 10 years later, despite this agenda having been voted unanimously, 
nothing had been done. In his draft law, Henry Fleury-Ravarin again raised the fundamental 
issue  of  whether  accounting  practices  should  be  regulated  or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  a 
liberal  system  should  be  implemented.  He  described  the  situation  in  France  at  the  time, 
remarking  that:  "In  the  absence  of  legislation  establishing  the  basic  rules  under  which 
balance sheets should be produced, it can be said without exaggeration that in France, the 
number of different methods of devising a balance sheet is almost as great as the number of 
companies"  (Fleury-Ravarin,  1921,  p.  1927).  Before  outlining  the  sixteen  articles  of  the 
proposed law he called to mind the advantages of regulating balance sheets and the situation 
in other countries (Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland and Bulgaria). The aims 
assigned to this draft bill were somewhat contradictory as the following statement reveals:  
"[…] the proposed legislation seeks to ensure that the regulations be widely encompassing, 
flexible and supple, and that they do not paralyse the indispensable innovative nature of 
business,  finally,  that  they  provide  an  effective  barrier  to  reprehensible  actions;  without 
harming honest firms in any way" (Fleury-Ravarin, 1921, p. 1930). The bill was referred to 
the Finance Commission which did not give rise to a report; thus the bill was never debated. 
B) Jean Chastanet, 1926 
Five years later, in February 1926, Jean Chastanet
3 submitted a draft bill aimed at reforming 
the auditing function in limited companies, regulating the way in which the balance sheets of 
these  companies  were  produced  and  regulating  the  certified  accounting  profession.  In  the 
second section of this bill he contested the way in which Article 34 of the Law of July 24
th, 
1867 had been written, as he considered that: "Article 34 leaves companies with the complete 
and utter freedom to present their situation as accurately or inaccurately as it pleases them. 
Shareholders  are  therefore  uninformed,  or  rather  they  are  ill-informed.  Moreover,  some 
companies have achieved, it must be said, a remarkable level of skill in the art of producing 
balance  sheets  which  are  as  brief  and  as  vague  as  possible"  (Chastanet,  1926,  p.  276). 
Chastanet also mentioned the hostility met when trying to implement a standardised balance 
sheet. However, he discerned a difference between commercial and industrial companies - for 
which regulatory balance sheets could not be imposed - and banks, for which they should be 
implemented.  This  distinction  was  supported,  according  to  Chastanet,  by  the  fact  that 
shareholders and the State had the possibility of accessing information from auditors, General 
Meetings  and  tax  officers  on  the  soundness  of  companies,  while  investors  in  financial 
institutions on the other hand had no way other than the balance sheet of knowing a bank's 
true situation. He added that the activity of credit institutions was even more susceptible to 
require such regulation because unlike industrial and commercial companies: 
"We do not find the many contentious issues that have hindered the regulation of 
the accounts of industrial and commercial companies in the balance sheets of 
banks. There is no need to find a way of estimating production costs, with the 
myriad  of  complications  that  this  causes,  or  to  assess  depreciation  made  on 
buildings or equipment, or check the true value of manufactured goods or stock. 
The balance sheets of banks comprise solid information which cannot and should 
not give rise to debate. The whole problem comes down to achieving the grouping 
                                                 
 
3 Jean Chastanet (1882-1946): Deputy for the Isère department from 1924 to 1936 and member of the Socialist 
Party group. His legislative activity focused particularly on social and agricultural issues. He also attempted to 








































1  5 
and presentation of these elements so that the balance sheet produced provides an 
accurate picture of the company's situation" (Chastanet, 1926, p. 277). 
Two years passed before the deputy Chastanet tried again by proposing a condensed version 
of the same bill. Despite the endorsement by two renowned accountants (Reymondin and 
Sénéchal),  the  bill  presented  during  a  chamber  sitting  on  December  20
th,  1928  was  not 
debated; the Finance Commission considered it unnecessary to present a report on the issue. 
C) Vincent Auriol, 1929 
In January 1929, the deputy, Vincent Auriol
4, left a draft bill on the desk of the Chamber of 
Deputies. His proposal, aimed at protecting savings and structuring credit, drew undebatable 
conclusions regarding business practices. 
"Gentlemen,  the  successive  scandals  which  have  taken  place  on  the  Stock 
Exchange over the last few months, the ever-increasing immorality of financial 
practices and the resulting risk for the general economy have resulted in such a 
stir that everyone is demanding new legislation to protect savers and to prevent 
stock market speculation. But other than the profound economic transformations 
that the socialist movement is demanding, is it possible to regulate the financial 
market in a way which will clean up capitalist operations permanently? We don't 
believe so. 
Many  attempts  have  been  made  throughout  history  to  quash  agiotage  and 
speculation! We are merely left with the impression of constantly starting again. 
Agiotage and speculation have always managed to burst out of the narrow limits 
within which we have tried to contain them. It seems that legislative efforts alone 
lack the power to deal with this matter; decade after decade the legislature has 
merely  acknowledged  the  development  in  size  and  complexity  of  speculative 
mechanisms,  the  accelerating  pace  of  speculation  and  so  it  must  be  said,  the 
growing immorality of transactions on the Exchange. The only demands to have 
been made have concerned the amendment of small details, as if the recording of 
these in texts were to immediately and permanently freeze, at a particular stage, 
an evolving situation for which regulation has done nothing other than mark out 
the main stages with acts and decree laws. To be certain of this, one only need 
take a glimpse at the financial history of our country over the last three centuries" 
(Auriol, 1929, p. 18). 
To remedy these evils, the Socialist deputy proposed the introduction of general company 
controls, structured around three aspects: 
  - the setting up of a High Council for banks, shares and companies; 
- the implementation of a system aimed at governing companies' activities; 
  - the introduction of checks on balance sheets and annual reports. 
On the latter, Auriol underlined that: "These checks will only really be effective if there are 
laws  to  regulate  balance  sheets  and  the  various  annual  reports  produced  by  directors" 
(Auriol, 1929, p. 22). He assigned the codification of standardised documents to the High 
Council  for  banks,  shares  and  companies.  This  standardisation  concerned  balance  sheets, 
                                                 
4 Vincent Auriol (1884-1966): Deputy for the Haute-Garonne department from 1914 to 1940 and member of the 
Socialist Party group. He was Minister of Finance for the Popular Front government (1936-1937) and became 
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operating accounts and profit and loss accounts. Auriol highlighted that the vagueness of the 
information provided was the fault of companies: "[…] in all cases, the templates to be used 
for  balance  sheets  and  the  various  accounts  must  be  included  in  the  appendices  of  the 
company's articles of association; it is currently still too easy to prohibit prying shareholders 
from undertaking any practical analysis of documents by changing the names of items and the 
layout of accounts from one year to the next" (Auriol, 1929, p. 22). 
Auriol did not fail to mention the issue of subsidiaries. In fact his draft bill featured an aspect 
of utmost importance concerning financial reporting in corporate groups as it foresaw that the 
balance sheets of subsidiaries should be annexed to that of their parent company, where the 
latter held more than a 20% stake in shares:  
"It is currently common for a company having difficulty disguising its balance 
sheet to exchange its portfolio for the unlisted shares of one of its subsidiaries; as 
the parent company's balance sheet generally mentions nothing as to the value of 
the subsidiary, all combinations suddenly become possible. It should therefore not 
be surprising that we oblige any company owning 20/100 of another company's 
capital to include in the annexes of its own balance sheet that of its subsidiary for 
the previous year" (Auriol, 1929, p. 22). 
On  the  whole,  the  90  articles,  presented  in  five  sections,  aimed  at  bringing  about  major 
improvements to the general operation of companies.  
In articles 44 to 45 entitled Holding et coopératives de placement (Holding and investment 
cooperatives), Vincent Auriol raised the issue of shareholdings again by setting certain limits. 
Article  44.  Companies  created,  under  whatever  designation  it  may  be 
(corporation, holdings, trustee, etc.), for the purpose of buying and managing 
other values using funds obtained from their shareholders or bondholders, may 
not issue shares for amounts exceeding their share capital. 
Article 45. Investment cooperatives whose sole purpose is to invest their capital in 
securities, will benefit from an exemption from proportional stamp duty and tax 
on securities income for the stocks and bonds constituting this capital.  
These investment cooperatives will be required to publish the breakdown of their 
portfolio in the annexes of their annual balance sheet. These documents will be 
subject at any moment to checks by sworn inspectors, appointed under this Act. 
Their  portfolio  should  not  be  used  to  cover  up  commercial  commitments  and 
should statutorily include some distribution of safe investments. It should never 
include more than 25% of capital from any other company. 
In  an  environment  which  showed  itself  unfavourable  to  the  improvement  of  financial 
reporting, the draft bill was never debated by the Chamber of Deputies; no more, for that 
matter, than were those of Fleury-Ravarin (1921), Chastanet (1926) or Auriol (1929). 
Law  PhD  theses  produced  at  French  universities  demonstrated  the  need  to  regulate 
subsidiaries and highlighted methods of financial reporting for corporate group development. 
 
2. The need to regulate subsidiaries in France in the 1930s 
For radically different reasons, subsidiaries were already regulated in the United Kingdom 
and Germany; in France, there was no regulation at all. Theses produced by Gégout (1929) 
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Spire  (1931),  Percerou  (1932)  and  Rosset  (1933)  showed  that  without  establishing 
standardised  accounting  regulations,  financial  information  published  by  corporate  groups 
would be useless.  
A)  Regulation  of  subsidiaries  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  in 
Germany  
The  United  Kingdom  Companies  Act  of  1929  contained  several  provisions  concerning 
subsidiaries; in particular, in regard to the power and remuneration of directors in common 
and to balance sheets. Article 123 of the Act laid down companies' obligation to supply three 
documents to shareholders: the director's report, balance sheet and the profit and loss account. 
The  Companies  Act  of  1929  also  demanded  that  companies  include  details  of  their 
relationship  with  subsidiaries  in  their  balance  sheet.  The  report  produced  by  the  Greene 
committee which was used in drawing up the Companies Act, stated that companies who 
wished to conceal their trading results had found a way to do so by creating "inextricable 
confusion  between  their  interests  and  those  of  their  subsidiaries".  Shareholders  were 
complaining that information provided by holding companies was unintelligible if it was not 
accompanied by comprehensive reporting on the situation with regard to its subsidiaries.  
In response to these demands, articles 125 to 129 were devoted to the issue. Article 125 
obliged parent companies to present their subsidiaries' stocks as well as accounts receivable 
and payable, in clearly distinguishable entries. In order to preserve business confidentiality, 
overall figures were to be provided.   
Article 126 outlined the duty of directors to report on how profits and losses were calculated:   
"Where  a  company  has  a  direct  shareholding  or  a  shareholding  through  an 
intermediary,  in  one  or  several  subsidiaries,  a  declaration  stating  how  the 
subsidiary's or subsidiaries' profit and loss have been calculated in the holding 
company's accounts, will be included in the annexes of the balance sheet. This 
statement should explain how and to what extent: 
a) the holding company has provided for the losses of the subsidiary, whether it 
be in the accounts of the subsidiary or in those of the holding company, or in 
both; 
b) the directors of the holding have taken account of the losses of a subsidiary in 
establishing the holding company's profits and loss account ". 
Article 127 clarified the definition of a subsidiary and the checking criteria:   
"When the assets of a company consist fully or partially of shares in another 
company  held  either  directly  or  through  an  intermediary,  and  that: 
a) the value of these shares (at the time at which the holding company's accounts 
are  produced)  represents  more  than  50%  of  the  issued  capital  of  that  other 
company or when this value is such that it gives the holding company more than 
50% of the votes in the said company, or that:   
b) the company has direct or indirect control of the appointment of the majority of 
the directors in the said company, this other company will be considered to be a 
subsidiary company." 
The  last  of  these  provisions,  Article  128,  focused  on  the  disclosure  of  amounts  paid  to 
company directors. Companies were required to publish: "the total value of amounts paid to 
directors in remuneration for their services, including all salaries, percentages and other 
benefits (emoluments) paid to them or likely to be received by them from the company or any 
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The situation in Germany was somewhat different due to the existence of extremely powerful 
corporate groups known as Konzerns. It was Article N° 261 of the ruling of December 19
th, 
1931 which gave the Reich government the power "to introduce clauses for Konzerns that 
would require end-of-year financial reporting and the production of a  balance sheet and 
profit and loss accounts showing the whole group's situation" (Sainton, 1938, p. 165). While 
Article  N°  226  of  the  Commercial  Code  prohibited  dependant  firms  from  purchasing  or 
applying for shares in the holding company, Article N° 240 prevented the granting of credit 
by the corporation to its own directors or to the directors of a company in which it held a 
majority shareholding.  
Article N° 260 contained details of financial reporting for Konzerns under which they were 
required to publish a report exposing any existing links with dependent companies or another 
Konzern. Instructions on the information required to appear on the balance sheet were given 
in Article N° 261. The latter aimed at having companies include the various details on any 
shareholdings they may have had in their balance sheets. Thus, accounts receivable belonging 
to the Konzern had to be shown as a clearly distinguishable entry. Accounts payable were 
expected to be handled in the same distinct manner. The last requirement concerned the profit 
and loss account in which revenue had to be presented in two categories:  that generated by 
the parent company and that generated by subsidiaries. 
While the Companies Act of 1929 already included a range of provisions on subsidiaries in 
the United Kingdom, the arrival of the corporate group phenomenon in France drove legal 
practitioners to investigate ways of making business practices more transparent; however, the 
lack of regulation in regard to balance sheets made it difficult to implement effective financial 
reporting measures.   
B) What legal measures were required to control subsidiaries?  
The  thesis  produced  by  Maurice  Gégout  at  the  University  of  Paris  in  1929  and  entitled 
Filiales et groupements de sociétés, (Etude juridique de l’intervention d’une société dans la 
constitution et le fonctionnement d’une autre société) (Subsidiaries and Corporate groups, 
(Legal study on the involvement of one company in the creation and operations of another 
company)) calls to mind the fact that large commercial companies were no longer satisfied 
with entering into alliances with competitors; they sought, henceforth, to form companies 
which would be under their control. The use of the term filiale (subsidiary) was not without its 
problems. Gégout analysed the word's etymology in order to establish whether it was the most 
suitable choice. Was it that, in making reference to the links of filiation between a mother and 
her  daughter,  the  mother  company  had  to  have  created  the  ‘filiale’  ex  nihilo  for  it  to  be 
described as such? Or was it merely the fact that one company was under another's control, 
enough to allow the former to be called 'subsidiary' and the latter 'parent company'?  
Gégout  also  stressed  the  phenomenon  of  multiplying  subsidiaries  and  pointed  out  the 
increasing number of listed companies structured as holding companies. He also explained the 
needs that were met in the creation of subsidiaries. However, even though he believed that the 
main motivation of companies was the search for critical size, he pointed out that the creation 
of subsidiaries was also an adequate way of gaining entry to foreign markets and ensuring the 
distribution of finished goods or work in progress on the market. Setting up subsidiaries was 
also  a  way  of  ensuring  supplies  of  raw  materials  and  components  at  preferential  prices. 
Finally, the creation of numerous subsidiaries by a parent company also offered it a precious 
opportunity to divide its risks. The main legal problem presented by subsidiaries lay with the 
involvement of one company in the setting up and running of another company. Gégout raised 
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exerted  with  less  than  50%  of  voting  rights  and  that  the  dispersion  of  capital  was  to  be 
considered as a factor in determining control.  
"A company which holds a major proportion of another company's capital can in 
fact  succeed  in  dominating  it;  it  has  a  place  on  the  board  of  directors  and 
participates in General Meetings, ensuring what the English call 'the control' of 
the  other  company. A  small  and  rather  homogeneous  group  of  capitalists, 
sometimes  representing  barely  20/100  of  shares,  can  succeed  in  controlling  a 
company. Such a group can even control, not only the company in question, but 
other companies in which the former owns a significant amount of shares: for 
example, one capitalist can, with about a quarter of a company's share capital, 
exert  control  over  it;  however  this  in  turn  leads  to  controlling  any  other 
companies controlled by the first company; it is a way of creating an 'omnium' or 
'holding  company';  there  are  thus  a  whole  set of  subsidiaries  which  comprise 
successive generations of companies for which the control belongs to a common 
ancestor" (Gégout, 1929, p.5).  
 
None  of  the  paragraphs  in  this  thesis  raise  the  issue  of  accounting  practices  in  holding 
companies and subsidiaries. At most, Gégout’s work includes several brief digressions on the 
valuation  of  subsidiaries.  The  thesis  remains  a  valuable  resource  in  so  far  as  the  author 
attempted to offer a definition of control. 
In  1938,  in  a  thesis  entitled  Sociétés  mères  et  filiales,  contribution  à  l’étude  du  régime 
juridique des sociétés de capitaux (Parent companies and subsidiaries - a contribution to the 
design of a legal framework for joint stock companies), Paulette Sainton discussed the issue 
of regulating subsidiaries. Unlike Gégout 10 years before, she included accounting related 
issues  related  and  proposed  a  study  of  comparative  law  based  on  German  and  United 
Kingdom legislation.  
The first section of this thesis introduced general concepts relating to subsidiaries and dealt 
with issues such as the country of the subsidiary and distinctions to be made between the 
assets of a subsidiary and those of the parent company. The second section entitled Etudes 
pratiques des filiales (Practical studies on subsidiaries) focused on the creation, operation and 
dissolution  of  a  subsidiary.  In  conclusion,  the  author  proposed  regulation  on  subsidiaries 
inspired by foreign legislation. This proposal for reform was part of an overall attempt to 
regulate parent companies and subsidiaries and stemmed from the desire to clean up business 
practices.  Accounting  was  to  have  quite  an  important  role  in  controlling  the  activities  of 
subsidiaries. 
Following the example of Maurice Gégout (1929), Paulette Sainton presented the advantages 
of subsidiaries, including the inherent flexibility in the process of setting up which she said 
was "well suited to the fluctuation of economic life as it depends solely on the will of the 
parent company which has time to strengthen or break the ties binding it to the subsidiary". It 
was also a safe process compared to a contractual agreement, as it was not necessary to obtain 
the agreement of the subsidiary in order to become its owner. Furthermore the process was 
industrially  productive  and  commercially  discreet.  Discretion  was  fundamental  to  the 
mentality  of  business  confidentiality:  "Sometimes  even  a  parent  company  prefers  to  keep 
secret the launch of a new area of business which is likely to scare shareholders who are ill-
informed  or  unaware  of  the  interest  that  a  certain  raw  material  or  new  usage  might 
represent" (Sainton, 1938, p. 11). Setting up subsidiaries also cost relatively little in financial 
terms  and  was  advantageous  from  a  tax  standpoint.  Sainton  concluded  her  views  on  the 








































1  10 
vertical  or  horizontal  integration,  ensuring  supplies  of  raw  materials,  a  customer  base, 
maritime  or  over-land  transportation  routes,  a  credit  provider,  or  widening  the  scope  of 
action to a regional, colonial or worldwide level, large companies always achieve it through 
the setting up of subsidiaries" (Sainton, 1938, p. 12). 
A reminder was given of the abusive practices that subsidiaries could give rise to, which 
shows  that  the  repeated  financial  scandals  had  left  their  marks.  Sainton  condemned  the 
various  forms  of  abuse  -  whether  it  be  the  creation  of  fictitious  credit  using  bogus 
accommodation  bills,  the  misuse  of  power  by  the  parent  company  over  its  subsidiary 
(draining the subsidiaries) or even the setting up of subsidiaries for the benefit of the directors 
- illustrating them by calling to mind the different financial scandals (Aéropostale, La Gazette 
du Franc, La banque Oustric). 
Also among the forms of abuse to which subsidiaries could be exposed was the creation of 
subsidiaries solely for carrying out operations which were prohibited to the parent company. 
This could involve, for instance, having the subsidiary purchase its shares in order to regulate 
share price and to sell them in due course.  
The  analysis  of  regulation  in  foreign  legislation  provided  support  for  the  author's  reform 
proposals. Sainton's work is organised into six articles within which the following subjects are 
discussed:  defining  a  subsidiary,  forbidding  reciprocal  shareholdings  beyond  10%  of  the 
capital, requiring an agreement at an Extraordinary General Meeting for the creation of a 
subsidiary,  limiting  the  number  of  terms  a  director  may  serve  to  ten,  limiting  company 
directors' power to terminate agreements where these directors are board members of both 
companies, publishing financial indicators for subsidiaries and the names of shared directors 
in both the annual report and the balance sheet.  
The most noteworthy proposals concerned the information which should appear in documents 
available to shareholders. The annual report had to include a special report on any agreements 
made between subsidiaries and the parent company and vice versa. The total value of sums 
paid by the parent company and subsidiaries to directors and 'senior employees' also had to 
appear. 
The balance sheet was especially targeted. The overall values of shareholdings and amounts 
receivable  within  subsidiaries  as  well  as  amounts  receivable  concerning  directors  had  to 
appear  on  specific  lines  of  the  balance  sheet's  asset  listing.  For  liabilities,  any  debts 
concerning the group's subsidiaries had to be clearly distinguishable from the debts of other 
parties. 
In the profit and loss account, it had to be clear which revenues came from the subsidiaries 
and which were generated by the parent company. 
However Sainton immediately put a dampener on her reform proposals by highlighting the 
fragility of the foundations on which her legal measures were built, that is to say, accounting 
practices. In fact the author concluded the study with the statement: "This reform will be 
difficult  to  implement  so  far  as  standards  for  the  entire  balance  sheet  have  not  been 
introduced in France" (Sainton, 1938, p.178). 
C) The improbable financial reporting of corporate groups   
François Spire embraced the subject in his thesis entitled La réglementation des bilans en 
France et à l’étranger (The regulation of balance sheets in France and abroad), researched at 
the University of Paris in 1931. He also discussed the effects that regulating balance sheets 
could have on business opportunities. Basing his arguments on the principle of individual 
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undergo  any  form  of  State  intervention.  Liberalists  opposed  to  regulating  balance  sheets 
argued that regulation would do nothing to prevent fraudulent practices as managers would 
hide behind legislative  clauses, interpreting them in their favour. The  other argument put 
forward  was  that  regulation  would  make  it  impossible  for  directors  to  carry  out  their 
functions:  "If  regulations  were  to  be  imposed  by  law,  we  would  see  company  directors 
resigning  en  masse  and  the  recruitment  of  new  board  members  would  become  almost 
impossible"  (Spire,  1931,  p.  58).  One  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of  regulation  was  a 
significant improvement in financial reporting for shareholders, creditors, bond holders, the 
State and tax authorities. On the whole, Spire declared that he was in favour of regulating 
balance sheets. However, he remained opposed to making it compulsory for companies to 
comply with standardised balance sheets introduced by law. He proposed that the legislature 
merely lay down certain principles and obligations
5.  
 
One  might  be  surprised  to  find  that  the  list  of  obligations  did  not  state  anything  about 
subsidiaries and shareholdings. Spire's view on this topic was surprising. He stated: "It does 
not  seem  necessary  and  even  seems  dangerous  to  us  to  oblige  companies  to  publish  the 
breakdown of their share portfolio in their balance sheet" (Spire, 1931, p. 129). The reasons 
given to justify this view are unconvincing: "Such a requirement, disregarding the crucial 
difference between the balance sheet and inventory [...]" (Spire, 1931, p. 129).  
It  is  in  the  thesis  Lois  actuelles  et  projets  récents  en  matière  de  sociétés  par  actions 
(Allemagne,  Angleterre,  Italie)  (Current  laws  and  recent  draft  bills  concerning  companies 
limited by shares (Germany, England, Italy)), produced by André Percerou at the University 
of Paris in 1932, that the first advances in accounting standards for corporate groups and 
subsidiaries can be found. Percerou's work was part of the reflection on potential reforms on 
company law in France which would concern balance sheet practices, corporate groups and 
multiple-vote shares. His definition of corporate groups was as follows: "The existence of a 
corporate group can be acknowledged in situations where several legally distinct companies 
are brought together under a common source of control; the control by common masters 
being in many cases a result of one or several of the companies possessing share capital in 
one or several of the others" (Percerou, 1932, p. 528). 
Percerou criticised this form of economic concentration in two fundamental ways. The first 
concerned the behaviour of company directors whose role was to favour one or several of the 
group's companies to the detriment of other companies belonging to the same group. The 
                                                 
5 - the production of an annual balance sheet in compliance with a template provided in the company's articles of 
association in which clear and understandable terms are used: 
- the categorising of assets according to their liquidity and liabilities according to their payability 
- the valuation of assets using the criteria provided in the articles of association and the publication of these 
criteria within the balance sheet 
- the inclusion of provisions for doubtful debt and the writing off of bad debt from the assets sheet 
- the entering of paid-in capital under liabilities at face value; any uncalled capital appears as assets under a 
special heading 
-the depreciation of assets subject to decay so that upon reaching the term of their normal usage duration they 
only appear in the balance sheet as a reminder  
- to respect the principle of Special Depreciation 
- to write off  incorporation and start-up costs before any dividend distribution; 
- to separate in the credits of the profit and loss account any undistributed profit remaining from a previous year, 
gross profit for the current year, operating income and random revenue. 
- to separate in the debits of the profit and loss account any losses for the previous year,  any gross value losses 
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second regarded reciprocal shareholdings which, according the author, created "a dangerous 
mirage of power and volume". One of the measures taken to limit such consequences was the 
implementation of legislation to restrict reciprocal shareholdings. Percerou did not believe, on 
the other hand, that publishing overall financial information or a list of shareholdings and 
their values, as was the practice in the United States or United Kingdom, would offer an 
effective solution. The reason given by the author was based on the widely shared attitude of 
the business world, highlighted in the following quote: "[…] And yet, such a measure has 
almost no chance of being accepted. People would oppose it, rightly or wrongly, for creating 
a barrier to 'business confidentiality" (Percerou, 1932, p. 541).  
The same concerns were raised in 1933 in the thesis by Paul-René Rosset, entitled Traité 
théorique et pratique des sociétés financières : holdings companies et investments trusts (A 
theoretical and practical treatise on financial companies: holding companies and investment 
trusts). Chapter XXII entitled Les comptes finals des sociétés financières (The final accounts 
of  financial  companies)  dealt  with  the  issues  surrounding  the  production  of  financial 
statements for financial companies. The author was apparently unfamiliar with consolidated 
accounting techniques as there is no mention of them in his work. He did, however, query the 
quality  of  balance  sheets  produced  by  financial  companies  in  cases  where,  due  to  the 
multiplicity  of  activities  of  the  companies  belonging  to  the  financial  company,  financial 
statements arrived several weeks or even several months late. This problem was even greater 
where there were sub-subsidiaries and when the dates of the financial end of year differed: 
"If out of two directly controlled operating companies, one ends its financial year 
on 31
st March and the other on 30
th September, while another company operating 
in  the  same  group  closes  its  accounts  on  30
th  June  and  also  depends  on  an 
intermediary  shareholding  company  for  whom  the  financial  year  follows  the 
calendar year, it is easy to imagine that the figures showing these companies' 
situations  consequently  go  against  the  aim  of  the  final  accounts  of  holding 
companies, that is, to offer a view of the  group's situation at a given time in its 
life" (Rosset, 1933, p. 312).  
Lateness in the production of financial statements allowed camouflaging to take place and 
fictitious dividends to be paid out. Rosset also indicated that with the current state of the 
regulations, the balance sheets produced were of purely relative value: "Moreover, in general 
we can only regret the lack of clarity and detail found in financial companies' balance sheets, 
often resulting in documents which have no true meaning at all" (Rosset, 1933, p. 315). The 
reasons for this are simple and widely acknowledged: on one the hand, the lack of regulation 
on  holding  companies  and  on  the  other,  the  lack  of  regulation  on  balance  sheets  which 
allowed  company  directors  to  blithely  confuse  shares,  portfolios,  shareholdings  and  trade 
unions. Rosset concluded that shareholders could not expect to find the information, to which 
they had a right, in the balance sheet. In order to find this information, shareholders should 
examine the board of directors' report and if possible, the full published list of shareholdings. 
However, the author made sure to add: "It is understandable that it is not always possible for 
a holding company to provide, in such a way, information which is perhaps of a confidential 
nature to the business, in a document generally published in thousands of copies" (Rosset, 
1933, p. 318). 
However,  in  order  to  circumvent  this  untouchable  corporate  confidentiality,  the  author 
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Throughout  the  1930s,  balance  sheets,  with  the  exception  of  those  of  insurance  and 
reinsurance firms, remained unregulated. Legislation proposed by Left-wing deputies with a 
view to changing the situation, were not pursued. While subsidiaries were already subject to 
regulation in the United Kingdom and in Germany, the Law PhD theses studied show that 
there was a need to regulate subsidiaries in France. Improving the quality of the financial 
information  produced  by  these  groups  of  companies  depended  entirely  on  accounting 
regulations  which  were  yet  to  be  established.  The  lack  of  political  impetus  impeded  the 
regulation of both accounting standards and subsidiaries throughout the 3rd Republic. Would 
the Vichy government play a role in changing this situation? 
 
3. The Vichy government's role in regulating subsidiaries 
and accounting practices  
Even though to some extent, the lack of regulation on accounting practices and subsidiaries 
contributed to the financial scandals of the 1930s, the ruling party's deputies never introduced 
legislation involving either aspect. Ultimately it was under the auspices of Marshal Pétain's 
National Revolution movement that two significant measures were taken.  
A) Subsidiaries and shareholdings in the proposed Plan comptable 
(French standard accounting practices) of 1942  
Standish (1990), Richard (1993) and Degos (2005) have already studied the origins of the 
proposed Plan comptable of 1942. The introduction to the draft Plan comptable quite clearly 
stated what was expected from the function of accounting. 'The purpose of accounting is to 
analyse a situation and state its results, enabling economists to then discuss those results; it is 
therefore up to the former to present the relevant data in a sufficiently precise, orderly and 
quick fashion, so that the other is in timely possession of the critical information required for 
this discussion' (Inter-ministerial Commission for the Plan comptable, 1943, p. 9). The draft 
Plan  comptable  suggested  a  set  of  terminology  and  general  provisions  (chapter  1),  two 
accounting  frameworks  (chapter  2),  a  list  of  accounts  (chapter  3)  and  definitions  and 
operational rules for accounts (chapter 4). The final chapter dealt with specific accounting 
operations followed by 10 annexes concerning cost accounting. 
The  plan  dealt  with  a  considerably  wide  range  of  issues  which  represented  a  substantial 
amount of work for those in charge of the standardisation process. The long introduction to 
the Plan comptable - which was in fact taken from an anonymously written article published 
in La Revue d'économie politique (Political economics review) of July 1942 - explained the 
plan’s  ambitions  in  detail.  One  of  the  aims  attributed  to  the  accounting  function  was  to 
support the management of organisations; part of which was the need to provide directors 
with  the  means  of  observing  and  monitoring  company  performance.  The  reason  for 
introducing the Plan comptable was to put an end to dubious practices. 
 "[…] moreover, little wonder if even in the most complex accounting, operations 
are classed differently, terminology is used differently, rules for valuing various 
assets  and  liabilities  are  never  the  same  from  one  company  to  another,  even 
within the same profession, the names given to accounts do not have the same 
meaning; operations of very different kinds are grouped under the same heading.  
What one company classes as a reserve, another calls a provision or depreciation. 
Depending on the methods chosen for calculating depreciation and the balance 
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very different amounts. Individual estimates are mistaken for book values which 
they  change,  without,  for  that  matter,  these  changes  being  justified"  (Inter-
ministerial Commission for the Plan comptable, 1943, p. 3). 
Information to be published concerning subsidiaries was mentioned here and there. 
The operations to be carried out when a company had subsidiaries were outlined under the 
section Règles générales d’utilisation des comptes (General rules on the use of accounts) 
which stated that:  
"Companies which are subsidiaries of another company, and which have several 
subsidiaries  themselves  having  amounts  payable  and  receivable  in  foreign 
currencies or have assets abroad, must also open  secondary accounts or distinct 
sub-accounts to record the following items separately:  
- on the one hand, accounts payable and receivable for the parent company; on 
the other, those for the subsidiaries  
- on one the hand, accounts payable and receivable in French francs, the value of 
assets located in France; on the other, accounts payable and receivable in foreign 
currencies,  assets  located  abroad"  (Inter-ministerial  Commission  for  the  Plan 
comptable, 1943, p. 25).  
The second reference to subsidiaries is found in Chapter  IV entitled Définitions et règles 
(Definitions and rules);  the Plan comptable distinguished between securities in listed and 
unlisted companies. In addition, a distinction was made between long-term and marketable 
securities, the latter being described as: "those which were acquired with the sole objective of 
making a use of funds and drawing immediate income" (Inter-ministerial Commission for the 
Plan comptable, 1943, p. 84). In regard to the valuation of securities, the value to be retained 
was  the  purchase  price.  Any  additional  costs  (tax,  brokerage  and  commission)  were  not 
included in the asset value and were to be recorded as costs. Document 1 provides instructions 
on the accounting methods to be used for the shares which appear in the balance sheets.  
Document 1: Establishing share value in the balance sheet 
Character and nature 
 of securities 
Assets  Liabilities 
Inclusion of a provision  


















Provision whose value may vary between two limits: 
- difference in the value of the asset and the value obtained 
by applying, for each share, the last half-year average share 
rating 
(1) published at the time of inventory. 
- difference in the value of the asset and the value resulting 
from the application of the average share rating over the last 
six years. 
In  addition  an  extra  provision  will  be  made  when  it  is 
justified by an event of exceptional importance (bankruptcy 
for example). 
Provision on the account 27270 
(1) the average rating will be raised on the basis of a listing of 















Provision equal to the difference in the value of the asset and 
the estimated value of liquidating shares 




















































Provision equal to the difference in the value of the asset and 
the value obtained by applying, for each share, the last half-
year  share  rating  (1)  published  at  the  time  of  inventory. 
 
In addition an extra provision will be made when justified by 
an  event  of  exceptional  importance  (bankruptcy  for 
example). 












Provision equal to the difference in the value of the asset and 
the estimated value of liquidating shares 
Provision on the account 27285 
From the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Plan comptable, 1943, p. 85 
The information to be reported when  a company  had subsidiaries was outlined under the 
heading Règles relatives à l’établissement du bilan (Rules concerning the production of the 
balance sheet):  
"The balance sheet is produced by all companies in compliance with the example 
provided in annex N° 6. The following rules must be followed in producing the 
balance sheet: 
-  When capital is fully or partially depreciated, the label 'depreciated capital' 
followed by the depreciated amount, is entered in brackets beneath the heading 
'capital'. 
- The bank accounts for which the balance is negative at the end of the financial 
year must be entered as liabilities, under the heading 'short-term liabilities'.  
- the balance sheets of companies which are subsidiaries of another company or 
which themselves have one or more subsidiaries must distinctly show the positive 
or negative balances of accounts opened under the name of the parent company 
and the subsidiaries" (Inter-ministerial Commission for the Plan comptable, 1943, 
p. 147). 
As regards the few professions which had already chosen to implement accounting standards 
(aeronautical,  perfume  and  dairy  industries)
6,  the  1942  Plan  comptable  was  not  widely 
applied.  
The Vichy government's regulation efforts also aimed, through Article 8 of the Law of March 
4
th, 1943, at preventing the negative impact of increasing numbers of subsidiaries by limiting 
reciprocal shareholdings. 
B) The Law of March 4
th, 1943: Preventing the mirage of power and size  
Pétain had a strong aversion to large companies and their sub-divisions in other companies. In 
his view large  companies stifled the economy  and small businesses especially, with their 
strength.  In his speeches, Marshal Pétain often used the English term trust: "Two fundamental 
principles will guide us (in establishing the new economy): the economy must be organised 
and controlled; State coordination must shatter the strength of ‘trusts’ and their capacity for 
                                                 
6 Archives of the Ministry of Economics and Finance. B-51 173, Note dated 28
th September 1943 addressed by 
the General Pricing director to the Director of Economic documentation in which he stated that the inter-
professional dairy associations which represented over 7,000 companies had already adopted an accounting 
framework and a list of accounts which they intended to make compulsory among a selection of businesses, from 
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corruption. Thus, far from stopping individual initiative, the economy must be freed from its 
current shackles by subordinating it in the sake of national interest" (Pétain quoted by Kuisel, 
1984, p. 232). 
However the term 'trust' matched an economic phenomenon which already existed and which 
was already so well known to legal practitioners and economists of the day that they simply 
referred to it as: the groupe de sociétés. By using an Anglicism, Pétain wanted nothing more 
than to heighten the sense of mistrust towards this form of organisation behind which hid a 
pell-mell of foreign economic powers, joint ventures and cosmopolitan funding. 
Several measures aimed at putting a stop to trusts were quickly enacted. Among them was the 
Law  of  September  18
th,  1940,  which  reduced  the  possibilities  of  acquiring  holdings  in 
companies,  limited  the  number  of  chairmanships  which  a  sole  person  could  occupy 
simultaneously  and  extended  the  legal  responsibility  of  chairmen  in  cases  of  bankruptcy 
caused by poor management. This will to undertake reforms was followed up with the Law of 
March 4
th, 1943. 
The Law of March 4
th, 1943 was one of the laws on companies to be introduced by the Vichy 
regime for reasons highlighted by Ripert (1943): "...under a new regime, the State intended to 
make the strength of its control felt by financial powers".  
Before this, the functions and duties of chairmen of limited companies were governed by the 
Law of September 18
th, 1940, as was the limit on the number of directors and their duties. The 
law aimed at concentrating the management of each company in the hands of a small number 
of people (the chairman of the board of directors) in order to make them bear a particularly 
heavy responsibility.  
This  law  was  repealed  and  replaced  by  that  of  November  16
th,  1940  which  included  the 
majority of the clauses from the former text while adding certain details to them: in this law it 
was foreseen, among other things, that limited companies would be governed by a board 
comprising a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 12 members, that the chairman of the board of 
directors would have the function of managing director, that no one could undertake more 
than two terms as chairperson, or sit on more than 8 boards of directors for companies with 
their headquarters in France.  
The works of legal commentators (Auger, 1943; Bastian, 1943; Baratte, 1943; Berolatti, 1943; 
Bosvieux, 1943; Deyzac, 1943; Mazeaud, 1944; Ripert, 1943) allow us to identify the origins 
of  the  Law  of  March  4
th,  1943.  They  also  show  its  contribution  to  the  situation  and  the 
welcome it received. One would imagine, given the political context in which this law was 
enacted, that commentators' reactions would have been extremely positive; in fact they were 
quite the contrary. The failure to present the reasoning behind the law was often criticised by 
commentators who were thus obliged to devise hypotheses on the objectives of the law's 
creators.
7  The  law  was  supposed  to  have  been  inspired  by  a  draft  produced  a  few  years 
previously, by a committee of specialists and representatives of relevant ministries (Bosvieux, 
1943, p. 1).  
The Law of March 4
th, 1943 focused on strengthening third party funding of companies by 
insuring lenders on the full amount of capital invested on the one hand, and clarifying the role 
                                                 
7 In order to study the obscurities of the drafting of laws under the Vichy regime, we refer to Dominique Remy's 
work, Les lois de Vichy : Actes dits "lois" de l'autorité de fait se prétendant "gouvernement de l'Etat français", 
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and  responsibility  of  auditors  and  chief  executives  on  the  other.    Various  aspects  were 
covered.
8 
In a thesis researched at the University of Paris in 1943, La réglementation des filiales (The 
regulation  of  subsidiaries),  Barette  suggested  the  following  definition  for  reciprocal 
shareholdings: "reciprocal or cross-shareholdings are said to exist when two companies have 
holdings in the other. A reciprocal shareholding occurs each time a subsidiary holds shares 
in the parent company" (Baratte, 1943, p 29). Baratte criticised this type of inter-company 
relationship on five aspects: 
-  They  (reciprocal  shareholdings)  infringed  the  prohibition  on  preferential  voting 
rights  (Law  of  13/11/1933)  of  which  the  aim  was  to  forbid  board  members  from 
becoming entrenched at the head of the company. 
- They infringed the principle of the reality of capital: every time two companies hold 
shares in the other, the asset for one of these companies is partially unreal because it is 
indirectly made up of a proportion of the company's own shares. 
- They led to one company being used for the benefit of another or several other 
companies, at the risk of causing their downfall. 
- They allowed fictitious credit via bogus drafts which were very easily drawn between 
subsidiaries and parent company. 
- They encouraged capital lock-ups during which every company holds the majority 
stake - a practice which was rather advantageous for unscrupulous boards of directors. 
                                                 
8 Heading 1: Provisions common to limited companies and companies limited by shares  
Article 1: Shares for cash 
Action 2: Bond issues and loan conversion 
Article 3: Sanctions 
Article 4, 5 & 6: Increasing capital 
Article 7: Exemptions 
Article 8: Subsidiary companies 
Article 9: Founders' shares 
Heading II: Special provisions for limited companies 
Article 10: Mandate of auditors 
Article 11: Remuneration of members of the board of directors  
Article 12: Appointment and dismissal of the chairman of the board 
Article 13: Chief Executive Officer, appointment of managing director  
Article 14: Exemptions from the law of 1940 
Article 15: Repeal of the Act 
Article 16: Entry into force of the law 
The provisions common to limited companies and companies limited by shares concerned: 
-  The liberalisation of the nominal amount and share premiums for shares for cash; 
-  the prohibition of any capital increase in cash before the complete payment of the former capital; 
-  the prohibition of any share or bond issues by companies whose capital is not fully paid for; 
-  the prohibition of any statutory provision giving the board or management the power in advance to 
increase share capital without prior permission at the General Meeting; 
-  the limitation of reciprocal shareholdings between companies limited by shares (Article 8)  
-  the handling of groups of shareholders with preferential rights to subscribe to shares under capital 
increases. 
The provisions specific to limited companies concerned: 
-  the exclusion of corporate bodies from the functions of chairman of the board of directors 
-  companies' general management; 
-  the remuneration of directors (fees and commission); 
-  provisions replacing Article 40 of the Law of July 24
th, 1867 on agreements or contracts between 
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In short, Baratte summed up the dangers of reciprocal shareholdings as follows:  
"[…] There is no longer any correlation between a company’s true size and the appearance 
of the financial tower which is endlessly stacked up on top of risky superstructures, creating a 
mirage of power and size" (Baratte, 1943, p. 51). Article 8 of the Law of March 4
th, 1943 
attempted to put an end to these undesirable practices  
C)  Article  8  of  the  Law  of  March  4
th,  1943  on  reciprocal 
shareholdings 
Commentators regretted the law's overall lack of regulation for subsidiaries, as it only dealt 
with reciprocal shareholdings.  Bosvieux (1943)  points out that legislators had based their 
work on an extensive draft of a Company Code for companies limited by shares, produced a 
few years before the war, but which due to the scale and number of innovations it proposed 
had  never  been  implemented.  Provisions  outlined  under  section  VII  of  this  draft,  entitled 
filiales et participations (subsidiaries and shareholdings), were intended to limit reciprocal 
shareholdings. Article 139 thus made the distinction between simple shareholdings, which 
corresponded  to  a  proportion  of  capital  comprising  between  10  and  35%,  and 
‘subsidiarisation’ which was identified as soon as the proportion of capital detained reached 
over 35%. The forbidding of reciprocal shareholdings only concerned cases where the stake 
held was over 35%.  
In Article 8 (Document 2), the selected threshold was not 35%, but 10%. Why did legislators 
lower the threshold to this level? Baratte offered three answers to this question:  
- legislators had retained the idea of the 35% criterion for the concept of subsidiaries, 
but had wished to extend the prohibition on reciprocal shareholdings to all companies; 
- legislators had wanted to abolish the notion of simple shareholdings and had lowered 
the criterion for ‘subsidiarisation’; 
- legislators, in a desire to put an end to reciprocal shareholding policies, prohibited 
them, in general, from 10% upwards, without wishing to prejudge the definition of a 
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Document 2: Article 8 of the Law of March 4
th, 1943 
Article 8 of the Law of 4
th March 1943: 
 Any company for which a proportion of the share capital, equal to or above 10%, belongs to another 
company cannot own shares in that company. 
Any company which possesses a proportion of capital in another company, equal to or higher than the 
percentage stated above, must inform that company by registered letter with acknowledgement of 
receipt. This registered letter must be sent within three months of this law becoming applicable, if the 
situation requiring the letter to be sent existed at the time this law was introduced, or if not, within one 
month of the situation arising.  
In cases where a mutual agreement cannot be reached between the two companies involved, either on 
the reduction of each company's shareholding in the other to 10%, or on the designation of which of 
the two companies should dispose of their shareholding, it will be up to the company which has the 
smallest fraction of the capital of the other to dispose of the shares comprising the fraction. 
In the case where each company owns an equal percentage of the other company's respective capital, 
and  where  neither  of  the  companies  accepts  to  dispose  of  its  stake  in  the  other  company,  their 
reciprocal shareholdings in one another must both be lowered to 10%,  
The disposal of shares carried out under the prohibition enacted by the first paragraph of this article 
must be carried out within three years of the date of legal termination of hostilities, if the situation to 
be settled existed at the time of this law becoming applicable, or otherwise, within five months of the 
sending of the registered letter referred to in the second paragraph of this article. 
 
A fine of 10,000 to 100,000 francs will be charged to the directors or managers having infringed the 
clauses set out in this article. These infringements may be recorded by registrars.  
 
The other aspect which caused commentators to question the article was that its provisions 
were  only  applicable  to  shareholdings  in  French  companies  and  that  legislators  had  not 
integrated the concept of indirect shareholdings. Despite its loopholes, it seems that Article 8 
responded to the wish repeatedly expressed by Marshal Pétain: to prevent the establishment of 
trusts and chains of companies.  
Apart from the issue of the percentage at which reciprocal shareholdings should be prohibited, 
Article 8 received quite a favourable welcome. Overall it was a coherent document offering 
simple and specific regulations. Nevertheless, there were several major loopholes. It is true 
that indirect reciprocal shareholdings completely escaped regulation; moreover, the complete 
lack of measures to ensure that companies be notified when a parent company's stake dropped 
below  10%,  caused  commentators  to  foresee  the  worst  possible  difficulties.  Lastly, 
commentators were extremely surprised to see that the criminal sanctions which would be 
dealt to company directors were not accompanied by a ban preventing the company in breach 
of the law from receiving dividends and using its votes. 
While  some  commentators  did  not  give  their  opinion  on  Article  8  (Berolatti,  1943  and 
Mazaud, 1944), Bastian recognised that it contained some undoubtedly practical provisions: 
the obligation to make additional payments on shares within five years, the prohibition on 
issuing securities as long as capital was not fully paid up, the need for the chairman of the 
board to be physical person; but curiously he did not say whether he was in favour of the 
Article. Deyzac (1943)  partly shared this view, recognising in  an article published in the 
Journal des notaires et des avocats (Journal of Notaries and Lawyers) that the text contained 
several welcome clauses, for example, those preventing companies from increasing capital 
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yet paid up from issuing securities, those preventing companies from having statutory clauses 
under  which  the  board  of  directors  could  increase  capital  without  prior  deliberation  at  a 
General  Meeting,  those  repealing  Article  40  of  the  Law  of  July  24
th,  1867,  and  those 
concerning  fees and commission. As can be seen, Article 8 was not on the list of welcome 
provisions.  
Augur (1943) employed a rather more sarcastic tone in the Revue de sociétés (Companies 
Review).  In  fact  he  hardly  gave  his  opinion  at  all  on  the  opportunities  that  the  articles 
represented; he simply presented and explained them. But it is the way in which he set about 
his review which made it vicious. The first few lines of the article set the tone: "We have not 
yet reached the twentieth law on joint stock companies since 1940; but we are on the right 
track. Once we reach the one hundredth, so say the good people, we will consider it dead and 
buried. Even though I am already further than ‘il medio del camin della vita’, I do not despair 
of  seeing  this  ordinal  attained  before  they  bury  yours  truly"  (Auger,  1943,  p.  65).  Even 
though this law had been well received abroad, Auger, in his conclusion, did not fail to note 
that: "this law only reforms details and we have a harlequin for company legislation".  
Bosvieux (1943) recognised that the provisions made in this law were "sound and should be 
passed", while Ripert (1943) demanded that a comprehensive law including all the rules on 
the operation of companies be eventually established. 
 
The  Law  of  March  4
th,  1943  attempted  to  bring  solutions  to  some  of  the  malfunctions 
observed in the business world. It did not focus on an overall regulation of subsidiaries, but 
aimed  to  limit  the  abusive  practices  which  occurred  under  reciprocal  shareholding 
arrangements.  The  classification  of  shares  proposed  in  the  draft  Plan  comptable  (French 
standard  accounting  practices)  (1942)  and  Article  8  of  the  Law  of  March  4
th,  1943, 
represented two areas of progress in the regulation of accounting practices and subsidiaries.  
 
Conclusion 
Left  wing  parliamentarians  and  radicals  attempted  to  introduce  accounting  regulation  by 
submitting various pieces of draft legislation. In a context where there was great concern over 
business confidentiality and where the business world was often tied to government members 
of the majority party, none of the proposed pieces of legislation on accounting practices was 
ever  debated  within  the  Chamber  of  deputies.  At  a  time  in  France  when  the  creation  of 
shareholdings in companies was becoming increasingly common, neither did legislators seek 
to use legal measures to govern relations between parent companies and subsidiaries The lack 
of accounting regulations and the setting up of corporate groups without any legal framework 
encouraged  the  development  of  grey  areas  which  led  to  various  financial  scandals.  In 
founding the National Revolution, the Vichy government attempted to put an end to such 
practices.  The  finalisation  of  a  draft  for  the  Plan  comptable  (French  standard  accounting 
practices) which dealt with some of the issues concerning subsidiaries and shareholdings, and 
which included Article 8 of the Law of March 4
th, 1943 limiting reciprocal shareholdings, 
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